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Minoritised communities and Hong Kong's 'summer of uprising': attitudes and engagement without citizenship

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ABSTRACT

Hong Kong experienced unprecedented political and social turmoil starting in June 2019. The original impetus was a proposed law that would have enabled the extradition of Hong Kong residents to Mainland China. The focus of previous work relating to the consequent social movement that opposed the law has been on the engagement of the dominant Chinese population. Little attention has been paid to the attitudes or experiences of Hong Kong's minoritised communities. This paper, therefore, shifts the focus of research to those communities, who are resident in Hong Kong but many of them are not Chinese citizens. The interviews with twenty-five study participants revealed multiple views of the social movement ranging from those who were in full support to those who were wary of the social movement because of its potential to impinge on an already fragile social context. The conundrum of providing education for the city's 'non-citizens' is discussed.

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The context

Hong Kong's 'summer of uprising'[1] caught the attention of international politicians and media. It came in the middle of the China-United States trade war and seemed to signal a democratic crusade against the world's largest authoritarian state. A recent review of selective English language newspapers within Hong Kong showed the extent to which media commentary portrayed this crusade as a positive social movement.[2] The movement started in June 2019 with opposition to a government initiative (The Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) *Bill* 2019) that would have made it possible to extradite Hong Kong people to Mainland China. Yet, as Lee et al.[3] pointed out, the protests eventually morphed into an anti-authoritarian, anti-China movement that lasted into 2020. The protests were eventually stopped, initially slowed by the onset of COVID-19 and then with the imposition of a National Security Law promulgated by the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress.

Lui,[4] commenting on Hong Kong's social movement, made the point that:

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> Protests in our contemporary world are expressive in character. They are howls of collective outrage that express a desire for immediate change without stopping to contemplate how such change might be brought about or considering alternative forms of action to bring about change.

'Collective outrage' was an important theme of the social movement. Usually, however, it was assumed that 'the collective' was made up of Chinese participants only. Yet Hong Kong is a city where there are 'minoritised communities'.[5] Some members of these communities were portrayed in the media as playing an active role in the social movement, with reports such as, 'Hongkongers from ethnic minority groups have said the protest movement has made them feel truly part of the city for the first time after suffering discrimination all their lives'.[6] A widely published story[7] about minoritised members' involvement in the protests related that some minoritised members gathered to demonstrate their support towards the protests outside the Chungking Mansions, a popular congregating space for some of Hong Kong's minoritised population. They distributed free bottles of water to the protesters while exchanging supportive slogans. A minoritised group organised this supporting event when a rumour was spread that protesters would attack the minoritised members and their owned businesses following an unsubstantiated accusation related to their involvement in attacking a frontline protest leader, known locally as Jimmy Sham. Afterwards, the group also organized cultural tours inside the Chungking Mansions for the interested people as part of their continuous show of solidarity.

Solidarity and alliance among some young Hongkongers of Chinese heritage, minoritised members of South Asian heritages and Mainland Chinese students in Hong Kong was also reported on the basis of shared distrust and anger towards Beijing.[8] Previously, Matthews[9] also argued that following the "Umbrella Movement', minoritised groups such as asylum seekers of African, South Asian, Middle Eastern and other heritages in Hong Kong were viewed as heroes by some young Hongkongers of Chinese heritage. Moreover, active involvement of some minoritised groups, including foreign domestic helpers of Filipino and Indonesian heritages, in previous protests related to local and global issues are also documented.[10]

The above characterizations raise issues about the attitudes and engagement of minoritised groups in Hong Kong's anti-China social movement. The focus of this paper, therefore, is to understand minoritised individuals' attitudes to and engagement with Hong Kong's 'summer of protest' and what it means for better understanding citizenship.

The paper will:

- provide a brief overview of Hong Kong's minoritised communities and their social contexts;
- review relevant literature;
- describe the theoretical framework and research methods;
- explain the findings; and
- discuss the results in relation to the attitudes of minoritised communities to Hong Kong's recent social movement and the implications for better understanding of citizenship.

Our analysis has attempted to unpack multiple views of Hong Kong's recent social movement to include those from the city's minoritised communities. These communities are usually marginalised in everyday life, so we wished to bring them to the surface. We show that their views cannot be essentialised since minoritised communities are themselves diverse. Including minoritised communities in research on Hong Kong's social movement provides a more holistic picture of the city's experience.

Background

Hong Kong's summer protests soon led to a political situation argued by some to have been beyond the capability of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government (HKSARG).[11] The protests attracted a great deal of media attention both locally[12] and internationally.[13] This major social and political shift in Hong Kong was often portrayed as Hong Kong pro-democracy groups versus China's authoritarianism, suggesting it was a contest between opposing Chinese forces. Yet this construction ignores the diversity of the Hong Kong community, in which eight per cent of the population have been classified as 'ethnic minorities'.[14]

The nature of Hong Kong's diversity has a number of special characteristics. These include ethnicity, temporary or permanent residency status, asylum seekers, socio-economic status, socio-cultural experience and intergenerational status. This is not an exhaustive list but we will highlight the heterogeneity of Hong Kong's minoritized groups in the following paragraphs to explain the diversity among minoritised groups in Hong Kong.

According to the 2016 by-census, a total of 584,383 minoritised people lived in Hong Kong.[15] The main minoritised groups are Indonesians, Filipinos, Whites, Indians, Pakistanis, Nepalese, Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, Japanese, Thais, and Koreans.[16] Whites, Koreans and Japanese mostly belong to a higher socio-economic group despite their 'ethnic minority' status.[17] The majority of the Filipinos and Indonesians have temporary status as foreign domestic helpers and are not granted permanent residency status even after living in the city for seven years.[18] Yet, Filipinos and Indonesians constitute over 10% of the minoritised population when foreign domestic helpers are not included.[19] South Asians, including Bangladeshis, Indians, Nepalese, Pakistanis, and Sri-Lankans represent 14.5% of total minoritised population.[20] Another group is asylum seekers, mainly of South Asian, African, Middle Eastern and other heritages, not counted in Census data, living in the city in precarious conditions.[21]

Many minoritised people are marginalised in society because of their socio-economic, socio-cultural and linguistic backgrounds, as well as systemic inequality and racism.[22] Census data show that designated categories such as Whites, Japanese, Koreans and Indians have higher monthly median incomes, whereas Filipinos, Indonesians, Pakistanis, Nepalese, Thais, Bangladeshis, and Sri Lankans have lower monthly median incomes compared to the whole population.[23] The poverty rate of minoritised people in Hong Kong is 19.4%, and South Asians, Indonesians and Thais have higher poverty rates than that of the whole population.[24] Thus, there are some minoritised groups who are powerless, involved in low-paid elementary positions, have low self-esteem, suffer oppression and feel discriminated in society. Although racial discrimination is illegal

under the Race Discrimination Ordinance (RDO), there are few enforcement mechanisms, so enforcement is often seen as too weak.[25]

There is also diversity within the minoritised population in Hong Kong in terms of intergenerational status. Some were born in their heritage countries and came to Hong Kong as first-generation immigrants. Other families were Hong Kong born, often then being second, third or fourth generation residents of Hong Kong. There is as much diversity within the minoritised communities as there is in society at large.

The above clearly shows the diversity among minoritised groups in Hong Kong. They are not a homogeneous group. They are made up of distinct social, economic and cultural groups who may view the community in different ways, and this includes how they viewed the social movement. It is against this background that the current study was conducted, a background of diversity within minoritised communities, as well as levels of alienation within these communities.

Literature review

While the political engagement of minoritised groups in Hong Kong may be limited, the same cannot be said for their broader social concerns. Research related to the social disadvantages suffered by many minoritised groups and individuals represented the initial focus of interest and concern for these groups. A key area is the current education system that often fails to ensure equal educational outcomes.[26] Numerous studies identified problems with regard to medium of instruction, access to kindergarten, progress from junior to secondary education, low participation rates in higher education, and high dropout rates.[27] The issues of an unresponsive school system, including the lack of an effective Chinese as a second language (CSL) curriculum have persisted for a long time. A lack of Chinese proficiency deprives some ethnic minorities from accessing skilled and professional jobs. They then resort to the elementary and labour-intensive jobs in the field of catering and construction. Worse still, it is difficult for them to seek secure employment due to not knowing Cantonese. A vicious cycle is created, resulting in intergenerational poverty for some minoritised members.[28]

Unfair treatment, including longer working hours and lower wages for some is not unknown, despite the enactment of the Race Discrimination Ordinance to protect minoritised people from discrimination. Minoritised people encounter discrimination on a day to day basis in the areas of accommodation, financial services, transportation services, retail and personal services, catering services, and medical services.[29] Mainstream media often portrays them negatively.[30] Minoritised people of South Asian, Southeast Asian and African heritages, and of low socio-economic backgrounds, are more prone to experience discrimination than others.[31] Racism is very much prevalent and embedded in the Hong Kong context.[32] The socio-economic and race-relations aspects are deep-rooted problems that sometimes lead to alienation and exclusion, including the development of poor relationships with the Hong Kong government. Thus, recognising both the complexity and uncertainty of minoritised identity and status in Hong Kong is an important approach this paper has adopted.

A second focus of research on minoritised groups and individuals relates to more personal concerns about identity.[33] This research indicates that despite a seemingly negative policy environment, many minoritised people see themselves as

'Hongkongers'. When pressed on their relationship to their heritage countries, there is variation in how they see this – for some it is purely instrumental and guaranteed a passport, while for others there is a stronger connection, especially where religion is involved. In these latter cases, people are inclined to see themselves as, say, 'Pakistani Hongkongers'. The large majority of those interviewed, however, saw Hong Kong as home, cared little for China, and sought closer identification with the Hong Kong community.[34] In Ng et al.'s[35] study, it was found that many minoritised young people held a fair sense of belonging to Hong Kong. Four factors, namely discrimination experience, sociocultural adaptation, conception of Hong Kong identity and social benefits in Hong Kong were identified and related to minoritised young people's identification with local or national identities. For sociocultural adaptation, inter-ethnic friendship and cultural similarities seemed to help blur minoritised groups' boundaries, resulting in their support of local identity. Driven by non-essentialised and inclusive perceptions, many minoritised individuals downplayed race, ethnicity, citizenship and passport requirements as components of their Hong Kong identity. They saw benefits in identifying with Hong Kong given that for many it was their place of birth, upbringing and lifelong residence. They also saw social and political benefits including corruption-free government, freedom, good education and convenient transport offered by Hong Kong. This seemed to suggest a rationalist calculation was shaping their identification with Hong Kong.[36] Moreover, some studies showed that minoritised students and youth in Hong Kong tend to prioritize a global rather than a national identity and that they show considerable skepticism towards China.[37]

In terms of social movement-related research in Hong Kong, relevant studies include Purbrick's,[38] which traced the origins, the processes and changing nature of the peaceful extradition bill protests to violent protests, and the role of the Hong Kong government and the police in the protests. Lee's[39] study revealed the social, and discursive basis of solidarity, how solidarity has been maintained, and the role and limitations to the ethics of solidarity. Lee et al.'s[40] study drew upon a number of protest onsite surveys and population survey data from early June to late August, and presented the core features of what have come to be called the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill protests (Anti-ELAB protests). The protesters were found to be highly educated, with 77.9% having university/diploma level qualifications or above, and the majority indicated a youthful profile aged 20–29, which occupied 49%. The protests were described as leaderless and decentralised, where the activities were coordinated through social media such as Telegram, Facebook and LIHKG, and pushed the city almost to revolution.[41] The identity and solidarity of the protesters were shared by the public from diverse backgrounds. Solidarity and mutual respect were the common ground between the non-violent and militant protesters, resulting in peaceful rallies and militant, violent confrontations. The protests were often portrayed in the international media fights between democracy and authoritarianism.[42]

Stott, Ho, Radburn, Chan, Kyprianides and Morales,[43] on the other hand, provided a perspective that is not based on the proposed 'democracy/authoritarian' clash. Rather, they saw the social movement as being constructed almost entirely between young idealistic protestors and what they describe as the 'paramilitary-style' police operations. As those operations escalated, it is argued, so too did the protesters' determination to break through:

> The experience over time of illegitimate and undifferentiated police action created the psychological unity where previously diverse groups with different tactics began to co-exist more successfully to achieve their common goals.[44]

This is a social psychological perspective that appears to ignore the broad political context that is highlighted in other literature.[45] Nevertheless, it demonstrates the different ways in which the social movement has been perceived.

Finally, there is a view on the social movement that acknowledges there were also problems on the side of the protesters[46]:

> There are moments of solidarity and expressions of heroic commitment and sacrifice. However, at the same time, there are aimless attacks on shops, restaurants, and individuals who disagree with the movement's central demands. Threats of revenge proliferate, and hatred is one important source of the movement's energy.

This is not the view of a dissatisfied, disillusioned, pro-government supporter. Rather, it is the view of a respected sociologist with a strong pro-democracy background. Yet it is in strong contrast to the views of Stott et al.[47] referred to above. Its importance in the context of this research is that it reflects the multiple views that exist in the community. What is not known is whether such views were reflected in Hong Kong's minoritised communities.

The research reported in this paper seeks to extend this literature by examining the attitudes of minoritised individuals, many of whom are not Chinese citizens, to Hong Kong's social movement. It specifically sought to answer the following three research questions:

- What did this engagement mean for minoritised individuals in Hong Kong?
- How widespread was such engagement within minoritised communities?
- What are the implications of such engagement for non-citizens and for citizenship education?

Theoretical framework

Sánchez-Jankowski's[48] articulation of 'civic subcultures' in an ethnically diverse society is helpful in understanding civic participation and engagement in pluralized societies. Civic subcultures underscore how group values play a powerful role on individual civic engagement. Group values are shaped by both formal (i.e. education, media, government etc.) and informal (family, minoritised community organizations, religious entities, etc.) institutions through transferring the knowledge of a group's shared history, and its social class experience and the social context of the place they live.

The concept of 'civic subcultures' questions the liberal idea of an essentialised civic culture common to all citizens. The protests and social movements under discussion clearly reflect the values and dispositions of groups within Hong Kong society. Yet given the diverse experiences of individuals and groups in Hong Kong, it can at least be hypothesized that attitudes to city's 'summer of uprising' will also be diverse. The key issue to understand is the embedded nature of civic subcultures within the broader Hong Kong community. As Sánchez-Jankowski[49] pointed out in reference to the United States:

> how the group has experienced America has a great deal to say about how they will view civic engagement and what types of activities they will pursue to satisfy feelings of civic obligations.

Civic subcultures do not exist independently but reflect broader social structures and the contexts that create them. The present study explores civic subcultures represented by Hong Kong's minoritised communities and the impact on attitudes and engagement with the city's social movement.

Methodology and methods

Grounded in qualitative research methodology and drawing on critical discourse analysis (CDA) as an analytical framework, 25 case studies were conducted based on in-depth, individual interviews with minoritised community leaders and individuals. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is concerned with the underlying ideologies and world-views in the use of language.[50] CDA focuses on social and political issues as they are constructed in discourse and the power relations they reflect.[51]

Case study based on in-depth interviews

A case study approach was used.[52] A total of 25 case studies based on in-depth individual interviews were conducted for around one hour each via Zoom, except two which were conducted face to face. An interview protocol was provided to participants before the interview and they were asked to sign a consent form that was accompanied by an information sheet about the research project. Interviews were conducted in the language preferred by the participants. Most interviews were conducted from May 2020 to July 2020 and were conducted in English, except for three in Bengali, one in Filipino and one in Cantonese.

Participants and sampling procedures

Purposive sampling was used, sometimes with snowball techniques, to recruit 25 interviewees including 13 community leaders and 12 individuals from five ethnicities, namely Indians (5), Pakistanis (5), Nepalese (5), Filipinos (6) and Bangladeshis (4), including 13 males and 12 females. They were aged between 20–69 with the mean age of 40. Details are provided in Appendix A.

Data analysis

Thematic analysis[53] was used to analyse the interviews examining commonality, differences and relationships.[54] Interviews were transcribed verbatim and the transcriptions were read and reread. Salient themes were created with special reference to the research objectives and questions.[55]

Findings

Three groups were identified, which demonstrate the range of participants' responses to the social movement (please see Appendix A). They are labelled as the Activists, the

Moderates and the Doubters. This was done respectively on the basis of their supportive, neutral and negative attitudes towards the protests. The next sub-section explains the distribution of participants in each category as well as further analysing each category in terms of ethnicity, community leadership or membership status, intergenerational status, gender and socio-economic status.

Minoritised participants' attitudes towards the protests

The first group was labelled as the Activists. This group made up 48% (n = 12) of the sample. They were generally younger participants and were supportive of the social movement with some actually engaging in protest activities. The second group was labelled the Moderates. They made up 40% (n = 10) of the sample. They tended to be older than the Activists and there was a variety of views, including some that were neutral. The third group was labelled the Doubters. They made up 12% (n = 3) of the sample. They tended to be the oldest participants and they did not support the protests or the government. Common to all groups was the rejection of the violence that was used by the protesters, irrespective of whether they initially supported the anti-government protests or not.

From the perspective of ethnicity, participants of Indian, Nepalese and Pakistani heritages were represented in all of the Activists, Moderates and Doubters groups, whereas participants of Bangladeshi and Filipino heritages were only represented in the Activists and Moderates groups. Among the participants of Bangladeshi heritage, three were Moderates (75%) while one was Activist (25%). Four participants of Filipino heritage were Activists (67%) while two were Moderates (33%). In the case of participants of both Indian and Pakistani heritages, three were Activists (60%), one was Moderate (20%) and the remaining one was Doubter (20%). Among the participants of Nepalese heritage, three were Moderates (60%), one was Activist (20%) and the remaining one was Doubter (20%).

Among the community leaders, five were Activists (38%), five were Moderates (38%), and the remaining three were Doubters (23%). All three participants who were in the Doubters groups were community leaders. Of them, one was born in Hong Kong while the other two were born in their heritage countries. Among the individual participants, seven were Activists (58%) while the remaining five were Moderates (42%). No individual participant was identified as a Doubter. Some community leaders disclosed their political affiliations as pro-government but they demonstrated a neutral attitude towards the protests. On the other hand, few individual participants disclosed their support for pro-democracy parties and demonstrated a supportive attitude towards the protests.

The average ages of participants in the Activists and Doubters groups were 32.5 and 60 respectively, indicating an intergenerational difference in attitudes. An overwhelming majority of Hong Kong-born participants were Activists (83%, n = 5) and all of them were below 35 years of age. On the other hand, only one Hong Kong-born participant was in the Doubter group (17%) and he was 45.

In terms of gender, six female participants were Activists (50%), four were Moderates (33%), and the remaining two were Doubters (17%). On the other hand, six male participants were Activists (46%), six were Moderates (46%), and the remaining one (8%) was a Doubter. This suggests only minor gender differences.

In our sample, the domestic helper participant, supposedly from a low socio-economic background, was in the Moderates group. Additionally, an overwhelming percentage of student participants were Activists (80%, n = 4) with just one in the Moderates group (20%). All three participants in the Doubters group were professionally a retired teacher, an NGO advisor and a businessperson.

The above portrayed a picture of the diverse attitudes of minoritised participants towards the protests. What follows are more nuanced understandings with supporting comments. They are presented using each of the three groups to highlight their similarities and differences.

The activists

At the beginning, about half of the participants remarked that they had positive and supportive attitudes towards the peaceful and lawful protests. They also expressed supportive views about the merits of the protesters, including their persistent goals (i.e. asking for five demands from the Hong Kong government), determination, ideology, solidarity and the unity insofar they did not break any law. Politically, the interviewees perceived contemporary China as a totalitarian or authoritarian country in the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, which they saw as detrimental to both Hong Kong and Mainland China as shown in the examples below:

> In the beginning, it was just a social movement where people gather peacefully . . . people would gather, really amazing atmosphere. People get there to protest again. Right. And so, I would join that. I would be happy. (Mr Daniyal)

> I am very impressed that they have actually done the protests digitally . . . I did appreciate that when the protests were happening . . . I remember walking in Admiralty when it looked like a war just happened. So, there were bricks everywhere . . . We are fighting for the future of Hong Kong. (Ms Maria)

> They were not breaking any laws and they were still persistent towards it and I found that very admirable . . . we are all ethnic minorities who are protesting against that in the beginning. (Ms Amrita)

> What I loved about the movement is the unity. What I love about it is the way they used social media and technology. What I love about it this time is a bit more English friendly because of the political nature that they needed the US, but there are more embracing to us minority. A very good example was, in the very beginning they put down the Islamic sign on the roads. (Mr Sanjoy)

The positive attitudes of the Activists towards the protests were projected through the lexical choice of words (e.g. verb phrase, noun phrase and adjective phrase) including 'gather peacefully', 'really amazing atmosphere' and 'very admirable' to describe or evaluate merits of the protesters and protests. Some positive vocabulary or praises (i.e. adjective and verb) articulated by the participants revealed their supportive, positive stance, such as 'I would be happy', 'I did appreciate' and 'I am impressed'; 'what I love' was articulated three times. All of these indicate the interviewees were standing on the side of the protesters.[56] The use of inclusive 'we' tends to suggest they were on the same boat, the insiders/the in-group with the Hong Kong people fighting for Hong Kong's good. Also 'we' indicated the minoritised people themselves who were united together.

Apparently, remarkable, positive and convergent attitude towards the protests is projected at the beginning.[57]

Some interviewees (e.g. Mr Vinay, Ms Vicky, Mr Lobo and Ms Amy) supported the protests throughout the interview although they were not necessarily involved directly. Nevertheless, they agreed with the ideology and the protester's political views that they saw representing freedom and democracy. While the previous section showed that for around half the participants there was support at the initial level, for some there seemed to be a sustained support of the ideology behind the social movement. For example, this was the case for Mr. Vinay, a 26-year-old of Indian heritage, born in Hong Kong but holding UK citizenship. He viewed the protest movement as 'a demonstration' representing the political values and ideals of the youth in Hong Kong. He supported their ideology despite the violence, arguing that violence also characterised police action as well as the protesters. He did not support the government's use of police to suppress the protesters. He offered a comprehensive picture of the social movement providing a well-argued discourse:

> I see it as a social movement . . . It is a protest, a demonstration. It represents the values and ideals of the young and future Hong Kong . . . both sides have . . . have had their mistakes. I mean in terms of the ideology, I kind of see the yellow side. I am sort of more aligned with the younger Hongkongers in the community, because in a way I understand the frustrations . . ., I see myself as rational while I do align towards the yellow spectrum. I do agree that some of the things that protesters have done, violence begets violence, right? Violence is in both sides . . . I can't support the government increasing police budget because all they are doing is suppressing the people they are supposed to protect.

The moderates

About 40% of the participants demonstrated moderate attitudes towards the protests. A few interviewees (e.g. Ms. Aishwarya of Nepalese heritage and Ms. Maria of Filipino heritage) claimed they held a neutral attitude owing to their engagement in higher education, their professional virtue, their ideology and no adherence to any parties. A few mentioned the protest movement was related to identity. For example, Mr. Bimal of Nepalese heritage remarked that the Hongkongers want to maintain Hong Kong's unique historical, political and economic positions against Communist China, which he saw as the reason for the outbreak of the social movement:

> I think it's more the identity issue. I think Hong Kong people want to establish their unique status, what they used to have historically. I think it is more about the identity issues and to establish their own identity, it's connected with the political and economical issues too, and how I think this is how it has been erupted. . (Mr Bimal)

Yet some participants indicated they changed their attitude towards the protests because they saw fault in both parties, the violence performed by the protesters, the need to respect others' opinions, the importance of a good image for their minoritised ethnic groups and safety, and their livelihoods. This suggests a close monitoring of the situation since the protests extended over a seven-month period and that socio-cultural phenomena are not a fixed issue.[58] The use of terms such as 'interrupting', no 'luxury to take the risk' and 'never endorse'. Violence is what most upset the participants. The inclusive 'we' excluded the protesters who were interrupting violently.[59] For example:

> I disagree with the violence, definitely I would never endorse violence, although I understand that some people might think it's necessary. (Ms. Maria)

> We are not happy with protesters because it was really, you know interrupting … (Mr. Bimal)

> But when it started becoming violent, I realized I don't really want to be part of the violence being a member of the ethnic minority, I don't really have the luxury to take the risk. (Mr. Daniyal)

While articulating their perspectives, lexical indicators from other interviewees, included, for example, 'very worried', 'in a state of shock', 'feeling sad and depressed', 'it's just downhill' indicated attitudes.[60] This suggested a convergence in attitude against the growing violent nature of protests.

The doubters

About 12% of interviewees opposed the protesters and the protests. Throughout the interview, they expressed their dissatisfaction by depicting the concrete violence in great detail and the negative consequences of the protesters' emotions. For example, Ms. Sushma of Nepalese heritage thought that the protesters were 'not acting like normal young boys' and 'like soldiers'; she stressed and listed the destruction the protesters had caused, including some public facilities, property and Hong Kong's image. 'Destroy' was articulated many times to emphasise the violent action of some protesters. She metaphorically described the social unrest as 'a civil war' to highlight her disdain. Her expressive values, anti-protesters, anti-protests and anti-destruction, were manipulated skillfully:

> They destroyed everything. They destroy the whole life … They did it just like a civil war. It was like a civil war when they captured the Polytechnic University, we are watching TV for the whole night and they're acting like well-trained soldiers. They were not acting like normal young Hong Kong boys, … They can perform like that, just like a soldier, … they destroy the whole Hong Kong image. They also destroyed light rail train signals, still not maintained … you know, there's no computer system now so you can see. Overall, we didn't get anything … You see it just destroyed us only … I didn't see any point to admire. Because people were killed, property destroyed … for hours and hours they are in the street … also schools were closed down. So eventually I don't see any plus to admire.

Ms. Shushma's negative attitude appeared to be reflecting the impact of the protests on her. Yet for others their response was more complex. Mr. Deepok of Nepalese heritage, who saw himself as minoritised person in a society dominated by others, felt that it was 'a bit difficult' and 'hard' for the minoritised people to participate due to their marginalised positions in society:

> It's a little bit difficult to participate in the protest directly. As ethnic minorities, okay. I take it as an ethnic minority person is hard for us to participate, although I wanted to participate because the number of ethnic minorities is very low. If the whole ethnic minorities participated in the protest it would make any good or bad impact on the population. If we participated as ethnic minorities population of Hong Kong, then Hong Kong government will tag or name ethnic minorities as against the Hong Kong law or against the China or something else. The damage would truly make us criminal.

These comments reflected the tenuous social and political situation in which minoritised groups find themselves in Hong Kong. They are residents and many of them are not citizens, even if they were born in the city. The dominance of the Chinese majority is obvious in every aspect of life. Others, such as Mr. Mirza of Bangladeshi heritage, also saw the fragile position of minoritised groups in Hong Kong. He argued that some minoritised people may not have any sense of belonging to Hong Kong, thus feeling both vulnerable and marginalised. He also felt that minoritised people are more likely weighing the consequences of support for the protestors including the chance of riots, being accused as criminals, being victimized by both parties and possible racial conflict. Being already marginalised in Hong Kong society meant non-participation in protests was the best choice:

> We cannot still feel, "We are Hongkongers", though our children who are born and brought up here in Hong Kong feel as local Hongkongers. Yes, of course, they used to think like this during their childhood, but when they grew up, they find a segregation in the society. Thus, we follow the 'wait and see policy' about the political turmoil in Hong Kong. In contrast, through our direct involvement there would be a greater chance of victimisation by both the parties (the government and protesters) of Hong Kong, though individuals have their own opinion.

Intergenerational differences in attitudes

Some interviewees highlighted intergenerational differences in attitudes towards protests in their families and communities. In general, the younger generation seemed to be supportive of the protests. On the other hand, the older generation was conservative and linked the protests to the disruption of their livelihoods. The younger generation is more likely to consider Hong Kong as their home; while the older generation would see their heritage country as home.

Ms. Panna of Bangladeshi heritage contrasted the younger Hong Kong-born generation, with a stronger 'attachment' to Hong Kong supporting the protests and the older generation whose livelihood was affected by the protests leading to their opposition. The younger generation identify with Hong Kong based on their place of birth and upbringing. Similarly, Mr. Pritom of Nepalese heritage remarked the older generation did not have a strong sense of belonging to Hong Kong owing to their wish of returning to Nepal. 'Never' is used twice, for the older generation did not feel Hong Kong was home, and the younger generation had no wish of returning to their heritage country. The contrastive conjunction 'but' is used to compare the differences between the two generations.

> The younger generation would be more supportive because they have been born and raised here. So, they would have more of an attachment. They would have friends who are participating in the protests. It's easier for them to believe in what's going on at the protesters side. But like the older generation, I think they would see this as unnecessary like disturbance caused. It's two sides. (Ms. Panna)

> I think, generation gap does matter . . . the reasons we never feel at home and a sense of belonging to Hong Kong. We always think of going back to Nepal. But these generations, never dream of going back to Nepal to make a good life. If I ask my sons to leave Hong Kong and go back to Nepal or somewhere else, or to a good neighbor, you know what they will say. (Mr. Pritom)

Discussion

A much heralded value of Hong Kong's social movement was its unity.[61] Wong, Cheung, Sum and Ting[62] referred to the way 'demonstrators offer sparkling visions of unity' in response to human chains that were formed across the city to showcase the movement's solidarity. Yet such unity was largely racialized in the sense that it was usually meant to include only Chinese participants. Yet as this research has shown, this racialized unity did not extend to many of the city's minoritised groups on account of the differences of views that have been shown. Differences of views within social movements, particularly based on social stratification, have been noted in other contexts[63] aligning the current study with emerging themes in international research. This enables the specific research questions posed for the study to be addressed directly:

- What did this engagement mean for minoritised individuals in Hong Kong?
- How widespread was such engagement within minoritised communities?
- What are the implications of such engagement for non-citizens and for citizenship education?

The Activists, in their support for the protests, including actual engagement for some, represented a 'civic subculture'.[64] Yet it transcended ethnic and racial lines to join the social movement in its opposition to both the local and national governments. This supports Sánchez-Jankowski's[65] view that 'where the individual's history deviates from that of their ethnic group, that history will take the individual closer toward the views and behavior of individuals in other groups'.

One reason for this boundary crossing may have been age, since the Activists were, on the whole, younger than the other groups and the social movement itself has often been seen as a youth movement, although there was broader support in the community that went beyond young people.[66] In addition to the age factor, many of the interviewees had been born in the city. Thus, the Activists may also have been reflecting a sense of belonging to Hong Kong, or at least a wish to belong. Such young people often saw themselves as 'Hongkongers',[67] the term used to indicate allegiance to the city rather than the country. This allegiance was often superimposed over their connections to their heritage countries as well as little or no connection to China. Yet identity issues of a different kind were also revealed when some of the older participants did not join the protests on account of the safety of the minoritised communities and the perceived need to maintain a good image of their groups. For older minoritised groups maintaining stability in a fragile social context was a priority. These identity issues highlight two different 'civic subcultures' within minoritised communities involving older and younger generations. To explore this issue further, future research is needed with a larger sample.

Given Zajak and Haunss' argument[68] with respect to European social movements, the lack of unity within minoritised communities should not have been unexpected. In fact, diversity of views was found within all five minoritised groups in this study and the reasons for this are complex. Views ranged from strong support to extreme opposition. At times, age was a factor, with younger participants more supportive of the protests with older participants being less so. Yet it was not just age that accounted for the diversity. Some people were aware of their own marginalised positions within Hong Kong and

feared that overt support would make this situation even worse. This view was sometimes supported with reference to local policies that already were seen as being unsupportive of minoritised communities. What this suggests is that the social movement was not viewed as a one-off event. Rather it was seen as part of the city's broader social context that for the young showed promise of a better future but for older participants threatened an already fragile social context.

Yet the attitudes of the participants were not static and should not be portrayed in any essentialised way. The adoption of violence turned many originally supportive individuals to becoming opponents. Participants showed different levels of support for the social movement, but violent tactics undermined most of this support. This is in line with the social movement literature that indicates violence often turns people against a -movement.[69] This is in contrast to attitudes within the movement that seemed capable of embracing both peaceful and violent protests.[70] Muñoz and Anduiza[71] referred to 'tactic diversification' as an aspect of social movements often when violence comes to be preferred over peaceful strategies. Such diversification, the reasons for it and the consequences of it needs greater attention in the Hong Kong context since its negative impact on minoritised communities overcame what initially appeared to be strong support.

'Civic subcultures' as described by Sánchez-Jankowski[72] help explain the participants' diverse attitudes to the social movement. Some participants considered their group history of exclusion and did not want to be further marginalised by supporting the protests, thus their oppositional stance. Others saw the promise of 'Hongkonger culture' as the means to win acceptance in an otherwise alien society. It could be argued that whether there was support or opposition for the social movement the result for minoritised communities was the emergence of multiple political identities.[73] These may well have been latent, related to existing policies that did not serve minoritised groups well and the protests brought them to the fore. For younger participants, the issue was about preserving Hong Kong's democratic spirit and values.[74] For older participants, it was fear of being victimized or labelled as 'scapegoats' for being minority – a discourse with which they were very familiar. There is some evidence that the experience of higher marginalisation can be linked to less identification with Hongkonger identity and belonging to the society.[75]

There are multiple ways of locating these results theoretically. Acculturation is a major theme in the lives of minoritised people as they grapple with issues of adapting to the values of their host society. This study has shown how acculturation processes can be intergenerational in nature. For young people from minoritised communities, there were values of democratic action, human rights and justice.[76] By contrast, in holding a strong sense of heritage identity, cultural values and norms were more likely related to harmony and stability.[77] These values possibly speak to acculturation and the extent to which different generations take on the values of the host society.

One explanation for these intergenerational differences maybe the strength of enculturation processes for younger and older members of minoritised groups. Enculturation is about cultural maintenance rather than adaptation.[78] Diversity within minoritised communities thus takes on multiple forms, not just in terms of age differences, but also in the ways different generations learn to live in society, what they choose to accept and believe and what they do not. Kim and Alamilla[79] pointed out with respect to the US

context that enculturation may occur later so that younger minoritised individuals are more likely to be more acculturated than older groups. This situation reflects the Hong Kong context where younger minoritised individuals were able to take on the local values of the social movement as opposed to the cultural harmony and stability that reflected the views of many older individuals. The timing of acculturation and its relation to enculturation is a productive area for future research and one which has been neglected in the local context.

A second theoretical issue relates to understanding the role of stratification in social movements. Zajac and Haunss[80] pointed out that 'the empirical analysis thus can reveal underlying conflict lines and emerging cleavages beyond the concrete policy questions addressed in each conflict'. This study has shown these cleavages both within minoritised communities and between those communities and the dominant society. The cleavages run along both age and ethnic lines so they are not the older versions of such cleavages related more to class. As indicated earlier one way to view these cleavages is with the concept of 'civic subcultures'. Yet in the Hong Kong contexts these are not simple or binary in nature. Attitudes to the social movement were not just those in the minority cultures versus those in the majority. The cleavages were much more nuanced, revealing strain lines within minoritised communities and between some in those communities and the mainstream racial group in Hong Kong. While the Hong Kong social movement portrayed itself as unified, attitudes towards it, at least according to this study, were not.

Hong Kong as a host society could well stand to be more inclusive – this is clear from the views of many participants. Often inclusion can be facilitated through citizenship education. Yet this study has raised a question about how such education might take place. There were participants in the study who felt a greater sense of belonging to the city yet these were largely young people who were also more likely to have supported the social movement. This suggests a challenge for citizenship education. In this study young minoritised people appeared to be more acculturated than enculturated and therefore more inclined to support local values as defined by the social movement. How, then, will they be integrated into a mainstream society that, following the social movement, no longer supports the movement's values? While the question here has been formulated with respect to minoritised students, it is actually a question for the broader society as well. Apart from brainwashing students to adopt a new set of values, thought needs to be given to developing ways of education for citizenship that are respectful of students and their values while at the same time developing an inclusive society. This is a significant challenge in a post-social movement world that not only reflected discontent but also aspiration.

Conclusion

The aftermath of Hong Kong's 'summer of uprising' in the second half of 2019 is still being felt. Yet in all likelihood issues related to minoritised groups remain to be addressed. The cleavages within these communities revealed by this study are likely still in place and this is an issue for communities to address. The broader issue of the inclusion of these communities in the Hong Kong society also needs to be addressed. This involves everything from citizenship education in schools to supporting some older community members develop a sense of belonging to the city. Of paramount is creating

a safe and inclusive environment where minoritised groups can engage in the community without fear of retribution. A better understanding of acculturation and enculturation may assist these processes as will the effects of social stratification on Hong Kong society. These issues represent a research agenda for the future that hopefully can result in a fairer and more just Hong Kong.

Notes

1. Lee et al., 'Hong Kong"s Summer of Uprising."
2. Bhowmik et al., "Ethnic Minorities and Hong Kong"s Current Protests."
3. See note 1.
4. Lui, "The unfinished chapter of Hong Kong"s long political transition", 275.
5. Gillborn, "Education policy as an act of White supremacy."
6. Lew, "The Hongkongers from ethnic minorities."
7. Kam, "South Asians Giving Out Free Water."; Ming Pao, "Kowloon March".
8. Lowe, "The affective cultural commons", 617.
9. Matthews, "Asylum seekers as symbols of Hong Kong"s non-Chineseness."
10. Constable, "Migrant workers and protest."
11. Purbrick, "A report of the 2019 Hong Kong protests"; Lee et al., "Hong Kong"s Summer of Uprising."
12. SCMP Reporters, ""Nearly 2 million" people."
13. "Hong Kong protest: "Nearly two million" join demonstration", *BBC News*.
14. Census and Statistics Department, *2016 Thematic report: Ethnic minorities*.
15. Ibid., 7.
16. Ibid., 21.
17. Ibid., 98.
18. Bell and Piper. "Justice for migrant workers?"; Constable, "Migrant workers and protest."; O"Connor, "Ethnic minorities and ethnicity in Hong Kong."
19. Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, *Hong Kong poverty situation report*, 4.
20. Census and Statistics Department, *2016 Thematic report: Ethnic minorities*, 21.
21. Justice Centre, *Annual Review 2014*; Matthews, "Asylum seekers as symbols of Hong Kong"s non-Chineseness."; O"Connor, "Ethnic minorities and ethnicity in Hong Kong"; Vecchio and Beatson. "Asylum seekers" Occupy movement in Hong Kong."; Vecchio, "The Economy of Seeking Asylum in the Global City."
22. Bhowmik and Kennedy, *"Out of-School" Ethnic Minority*; Henshaw, "Inspired by protests"; Hui, "The "ghetto at the center of the world"; Chung, "Co-cultural analysis."
23. See note 20 above.
24. See note 19 above.
25. Henshaw, "Inspired by protests."
26. Bhowmik and Kennedy, *"Out of-School" Ethnic Minority*.
27. Arat et al., "A systematic review"; Bhowmik and Kennedy, *"Out of-School" Ethnic Minority*; Bhowmik, Kennedy and Hue, "Education for all"; Gube and Gao, *Education, ethnicity and equity*.
28. Kapai, *Status of Ethnic Minorities*.
29. Equal Opportunities Commission, *Study on Discrimination*.
30. Erni and Leung, *South Asian Minorities and the Mainstream Media*.
31. Matthews, "Ghetto at the center of the world: Chungking Mansions, Hong Kong."
32. Bhowmik and Kennedy, *"Out of-School" Ethnic Minority*; Kapai, *Status of Ethnic Minorities*.
33. Ng and Kennedy, "Citizenship status and identities"; Ng et al., "What contributes to."
34. Ng and Kennedy, "Citizenship status and identities."
35. Ng et al., "What contributes to."

36. Ibid.
37. Chee, "Local and Global, but Not National"; Gu et al., "Ethnic minority students";Ng and Kennedy, "Citizenship status and identities."."
38. Purbrick, "A report of the 2019 Hong Kong protests."
39. Lee, "Solidarity in the Anti-Extradition Bill."
40. See note 1.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Stott et al., "Patterns of "disorder"."
44. Ibid., 832.
45. See note 1.
46. Lui, "The unfinished chapter", 275.
47. See note 43.
48. Sánchez-Jankowski, "Minority Youth and Civic Engagement."
49. Ibid., 243.
50. Fairclough, *Language and Power*; Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis.*
51. Chung, "Teaching and Learning English."
52. Stake, "Case Studies."; Yin, "*Qualitative research."*
53. Aronson, "thematic analysis."
54. Harding, "*Qualitative Data Analysis."*
55. Strauss and Corbin, *Basics of qualitative research.*
56. See note 50.
57. Ibid.
58. Chung, "Co-cultural analysis."
59. See note 50.
60. Ibid.
61. Stott et al., "Patterns of "disorder""; Shek, "Protests in Hong Kong (2019–2020)."
62. Wong et al., "Demonstrators offer sparkling visions."
63. Zajak and Haunss, *Social stratification and social movements.*
64. See note 48.
65. Ibid., 237.
66. See note 1.
67. See note 34.
68. See note 63.
69. Wasow, "Agenda seeding."
70. See above 45.
71. Muñoz and Anduiza, ""If a fight starts", 485.
72. See note 48.
73. Pachi and Barrett, "Civic and political engagement."
74. Levinson, "Citizenship and Civic Education."
75. See note 35.
76. See note 74.
77. Ting-Toomey et al., "Ethnic identity salience."
78. Kim and Alamilla, "Acculturation and enculturation."
79. Ibid.
80. Zajak and Haunss, *Social stratification and social movements*, 50.

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Appendix A

Demographic profiles of the participants and their overall attitudes towards the social movement.

Interviewee (Pseudonyma)	Age	Sex	Ethnicity	Birthplace/Citizenship/ Duration of residence in HK	Occupation	Overall attitudes
Syeda	52	M	Bangladeshi	Bangladesh/Bangladesh/27	Business	Mod
Mirzaa	54	M	Bangladeshi	Bangladesh/HKSAR/30	Business	Mod
Shaha	48	M	Bangladeshi	Bangladesh/HKSAR/25	Business	Mod
Panna	20	F	Bangladeshi	Hong Kong/HKSAR/20	Student	Act
Loboa	45	M	Filipino	Philippines/Filipino/17	Program coordinator	Act
Amya	N/A	F	Filipino	Philippines/Filipino/33	Journalist	Act
Maria	33	F	Filipino	Philippines/Filipino/32	Journalist	Mod
Vicky	24	F	Filipino	Hong Kong/Filipino/23	N/A	Act
Elliza	46	F	Filipino	Philippines/Filipino/23	Domestic helper	Mod
Malolos	28	F	Filipino	Hong Kong/Filipino/28	Law firm marketer	Act
Vinaya	26	M	Indian	Hong Kong/British/26	Student	Act
Aditia	69	F	Indian	India/Indian/20	Retired teacher	Doub
Sanjoya	34	M	Indian	Hong Kong/HKSAR/34	Social worker	Act
Mizan	20	M	Indian	India/Indian/20	Student	Act
Amrita	23	F	Indian	India/HKSAR/23	Teacher	Mod
Bimala	40	M	Nepalese	Nepal/Nepalese/21	Educator	Mod
Sushmaa	65	F	Nepalese	Nepal/Nepalese/44	NGO advisor	Doub
Pritom	60	M	Nepalese	Nepal/Nepalese/25	Music teacher	Mod
Deepok	48	M	Nepalese	Nepal/Nepalese/24	Building management	Act
Aishwarya	44	F	Nepalese	Nepal/Nepalese/3	Student	Mod
Daniyala	30	M	Pakistani	Pakistan/Pakistani/14	Business consultant	Act
Hakima	58	M	Pakistani	Pakistan/British/55	Association chairman	Mod
Javeda	45	M	Pakistani	Hong Kong/HKSAR/45	Business	Doub
Aqsaa	27	F	Pakistani	Pakistan/Pakistani/10	Teacher	Act
Aqidah	23	F	Pakistani	Pakistan/Pakistani/17	Student	Act

a*denotes the participant is a minoritised community leader*
Act = Activists, Mod = Moderates, Doub = Doubters