change our nature. It was not only that we knew enough now perhaps—if we took a risk—to save the second half-brain. Many of our surgeons would have agreed, in theory. She persuaded us that if we could, we should. Not by argument about rights: as I said, we were slow to accept this. She argued that—rights apart—one could justify the first operation because it saved valuable Gunddhian material. But if so, how could it make sense to waste equally valuable material, if we could save it? Remember that those who fell ill of the disease were unusually talented; and their talents were not held equally by both half-brains.

"Even in hindsight, I think she was probably right. At the time, to most Gunddhians, it seemed unarguable. We had a controlled population; we had enough *anddos*, since Gunddhians usually die of something in the brain; we had surgeons already interested in the half-brain sickness; the disease still seemed comparatively rare. And so three generations after Lalkh Mowi, our first regenerated half-brain, we tried an *anddo*-to-half-brain transplant. And it worked; and almost everyone who met the result agreed that this was another person".

(*This is the second part of a six-part article.*)

Notes

1. This refers to the threatened suit by the children of J. and R. Samoto, J-J. Mousney, R. Lulling and A.J. Beke against the Atomic Energy Commission of Cratylus in 2097–2098. On the advice of a majority in the College of Interspecific Law the defendants (in effect the planetary government of Cratylus) settled out of court. Badsha's 'entail' principle was crucial here: the damage was done not only before birth but before conception, by radiation on one or both parents' germ plasm—allegedly through negligence and without their knowledge. (Ed.)

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Book Reviews

Malcolm Budd
Music and the Emotions: the Philosophical Theories
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul pb 1992, first published in hardback 1985, pp. 176; ISBN 0-415-08779-1; £12.99

We should be grateful that this book, first published in 1985, has finally appeared in paperback, since it really should have been made available to those of relatively limited means long ago. When it first appeared it was greeted with delight by its reviewers, some of whose comments are, inevitably, reproduced by the publishers in the rear of the paperback. One tells us that "Budd's systematic and elegant refutation of the leading theories puts the whole topic in a new light"; another asserts that "Budd's careful critique of previous theories is devastating". There is no doubt that this is a very good book, nor that its approach is essentially negative. The reader should be warned of this but not be put off, yet perhaps still has some right to complain. At the close Budd writes "If my arguments are correct, a new theory of music is needed; and if this theory is to be revealing it will, I believe, have to be less monolithic than the theories I have rejected". We are given no clear invitation to seek further, to speculate on why a less monolithic theory should be needed, or on how such a theory might even begin to look. This is a woeful fault. It is also, I think, an unnecessary one, for the seeds of such speculations are already present in Budd's account.

In one of the most famous exchanges of one-liners in modern philosophy the young Frank Ramsey replied to Wittgenstein's haunting conclusion to the *Tractatus*, "of what we cannot speak, we must remain silent" with the retort, "and you can't whistle it either". He was probably right in supposing that the thought that this might just be possible—that music could somehow express the inexpressible—had tantalized Wittgenstein. But what a strange thought! For how could we ever know that this was the case?

How could we ever identify what it was that might be whistled but could not possibly be spoken? Music is an essentially abstract art: there are no ways in which music could in principle denote states of affairs that are or might be, no way in which a piece of music could be true or false, accurate or inaccurate, of some part of the world. The beauty of music lies in the music itself, not in some further thing which it is 'about'. Yet for all that, music, like other sorts of abstract art, does reach beyond itself, does reach somehow towards a non-musical universe in which we may feel joy or sadness, gloom or cheerfulness. To say of a piece of music that it has these qualities is not to use such words strangely, but normally. And normally these words are not, and could not be, restricted to music. There is a deep dilemma here both for philosophy and for music itself. In the history of thought about music the dilemma often shows itself in what can seem to be a constant tension between formalist theories of music—where the essence of the matter lies in the internal patterns of musical forms—and expressive theories, which focus on the expression of the emotions: just as the morning stars sang together and the sons of God shouted for joy so may we, and so must music, and weep or sigh too. Though Budd fails to pursue the matter, a precisely comparable tension exists concerning abstract painting. The tension has to do with the very idea of non-representational art. One thing is certain: it would completely falsify the matter to try to portray non-representational works as 'really', 'somehow', being representational. How then should we proceed?

No book better than Budd's sets before us the range of philosophical theories of musical understanding that we should take seriously. Having begun his account with a convincing, if somewhat unadventurous, and broadly Aristotelian, account of the emotions, he presents us first with the views of Eduard Hanslick's famous book, *The Beautiful in Music*. This may be read, as Budd reads it, as a rich formalist thesis that rejects the idea that the beautiful in music is tied to emotion. Budd says far less about the positive aspect of Hanslick's thesis, that what we attend to in music, what in a particularly musical manner we understand in music, is sensuous auditory movement, "forms moved in sounding". This is not an expression, a depiction, or an analogue of emotion, but something far closer to what Kant thought of as the subject-matter of any 'pure' aesthetic response, which he called 'beauty', and which he described as "the form of finality without end". This can seem like a weird idea, but we can begin to get a grasp of it if we think of the recognition of the kind of internally organized structure that we might admire in admiring a perfectly functioning machine—for its sheer beauty—without any idea that it was *for* anything at all. We might admire a clock, for example, as a piece of moving sculpture, without knowing or caring about its capacity to tell the time. Think of music as like that: with the difference that music is not sculpture, since it is a non-spatial art form.

Having rejected Hanslick by pointing out that we can and sometimes must say that music really does have emotional qualities, Budd next turns to C.C. Pratt's *The Meaning of Music*, and then to Edmund Gurney's *The Power of Sound*. Gurney connected the peculiar qualities of emotion we feel in response to music with Darwin's theory of the primitive development of musical response from how our "half human ancestors long ago aroused each other's ardent passions during their courtship and rivalry". Music, for Darwin, really seems to have been the food of love. For Schopenhauer music, or perhaps the all-pervading metaphor of music, was the proper embodiment of our unavoidable sense of our own will. Budd's conclusion is sternly dismissive: "Schopenhauer is the musician's philosopher. But Schopenhauer's philosophy of music is not a fitting monument to the art". The views of Susan Langer, Deryck Cooke, R.K. Elliot, Roger Scruton and Leonard Meyer are all, in turn, carefully and informatively dismantled.

There is no doubt that an excellent way of examing any theory is to subject it to searching and often destructive criticism, and Budd is normally fair and almost always to the point. But it is at best only half the book we might have hoped for. What we may wonder is why, for all their various weaknesses, the accounts he attends to are worth considering. To many readers this will be obvious; what is not so clear is in what way it is obvious to Budd. Yet there does seem to be a subtext here that could provide an answer. Music, Budd always acknowledges, requires two things of us. It requires some kind of understanding, which, however irreducibly musical, is still essentially *understanding*; and it demands of us, very often, a proper emotional response. Musical works can be understood and can be misunderstood: in some quite fundamental sense it must be true of any serious music in whatever genre that we may succeed or fail to get the point of what it is doing. Music in this sense inevitably demands a kind of intelligence in our attention, whether as listeners or as performers. It also lays claim to our feelings, often to our most powerful emotions. The philosophical challenge that music presents is thus, inevitably, concerned with these concepts. Budd may be right that the overall error in the previous accounts of this that he considers is that they nearly all require a too-monolithic theory of all possible music. What he fails to bring to the fore is that the facts with which they are concerned may at the same time demand a quite wholesale reconsideration of these central concepts in philosophy. In another context, the poet William Blake said,

strangely, that "a tear is an intellectual thing". We can, if we are not too corrupted by philosophy, feel the force of this: the philosophical challenge of music is to make such thoughts less strange. We owe a debt to Budd for having shown just how much philosophical work there is still to do.

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A Hegel Dictionary
Michael Inwood
Oxford, Basil Blackwell
347 pp.; ISBN 0-631-17533-4; £14.95

A Rousseau Dictionary
N.J.H. Dent
Oxford, Basil Blackwell
279 pp.; ISBN 0-631-17569-5; £14.99

These are two from a new series of 'Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries'. One problem with such a series must be that some philosophers litter their work with technical terms and neologisms, others present their arguments in language that is really quite straightforward. On the face of it, both Hegel and Rousseau need this sort of handbook, though for different reasons. Hegel is systematic, but often rather obscure; Rousseau is clear on the surface but his treatment of key issues is scattered unsystematically through his writings. The reader of Hegel is therefore in need of an elucidation of technical terms that he uses fairly consistently, the reader of Rousseau needs to be told that the discussion of, say, *amour propre* in the *Second Discourse* is misleading if not supplemented by *Emile*. Both Inwood and Dent are successful in these tasks, but at the end of the day it is Inwood's work that is the more necessary.

This was brought home to me recently. Faced with the problem of rendering the French '*presupposé posé*' into English, I was informed by an eminent French philosopher that the correct English translation is 'posited presupposition'. This may have solved one difficulty, but it at once presented me with another. What on earth is meant by 'positing', 'to posit', and so on? Luckily, a visit to our local bookshop provided the answer, for there I happened upon Michael Inwood's admirably clear guide to Hegelese and found an informative entry on 'positing and presupposition'. One of the great difficulties with Hegel is not that he uses words that are unfamiliar to us on the surface, but rather that he frequently assigns to them an unusual technical meaning. Inwood is a great help in deciphering all this. Hegel's use of language is further clarified by an admirable introductory essay on that very subject which charts the development of philosophical German from Wolff through Kant to Hegel. Not only is Hegel's idiosyncratic use of language well covered, Inwood also provides us with useful summaries of Hegel's principal works and an annotated bibliography. This is much more than a dictionary, it is an invaluable research tool for anyone trying to come to grips with some part of Hegel's thought or for that matter trying to decipher Hegelisms in the work of later writers outside the analytic tradition.

N.J.H. Dent's *A Rousseau Dictionary* is also an excellent work. Clearly presented with problems and discussions placed in context and the reader pointed towards worthwhile secondary literature, the book would be a must for any prospective inquirer into Rousseau's thought were it not for one thing. Dent has already done ninety per cent of the work in his excellent *Rousseau*, a book that is essential reading not just for the Rousseau scholar and student but for anyone interested in moral psychology or political philosophy. It is possible to learn a few extra things from the 'Dictionary'—there is more about Rousseau's life, about his music and fiction—but *Rousseau* is probably the better buy for someone who possesses neither book. In both the dictionary and the earlier work, Dent presents a Rousseau who provides a serious alternative both to Humean and Kantian views of practical reason. Views normally associated with Hegel, Marx or Sartre are found prefigured in Rousseau, who often has a grasp of the dialectics of interpersonal relations that exceeds in power and sophistication the work of his successors. Rousseau emerges not as a cranky worshipper of the 'noble savage' but as someone who at the very beginning of the modern age grasped many of the crucial implications of that age for social being.

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Consciousness Explained
Daniel C. Dennett
Allen Lane, 1992, £20 hb, forthcoming,
Harmondsworth, Penguin £7.99

The Problem of Consciousness
Colin McGinn
Oxford, Basil Blackwell
1992 pb £13.99

As you lie asleep your body tosses and turns. It does not do this at random but in response to signals that muscles are becoming cramped and joints damaged. These signals use the same pathways that when you are awake cause you to feel pain. They are pain sensations that you are not aware of. Do your limbs hurt when you are asleep, without your being aware of the pain?

You are sitting in a comfortable chair reading. In the background an electric fan is whirring, but you are not aware of it. The fan stops. Suddenly you are aware of the silence. And you are aware of the fan's pattern during the past several seconds, the rhythmic changes in its timbre. How can the fan's stopping make you aware of sounds that happened before it stopped?

These are questions about