

simplification, since the truth of the bridge laws ensures only covariation and not identity (96–7). Indeed, if such bridge laws were true, their truth would be precisely what an account of the mind would have to explain. He then offers an alternative account of reduction according to which the properties to be reduced are first understood functionally and then identified with their physical realizers. A functional analysis of our mental terms is thus not, according to Kim, incompatible with a reductive account of the mental, but is rather actually required for such reductive accounts to succeed (101). Such a reduction is not susceptible to many of the criticisms justly leveled against traditional reductive accounts, and Kim defends his account against a number of objections, while discussing a number of potential problems (such as the role of qualia) that remain.

The book is adapted from a series of public lectures, and the comparatively informal tone that it has preserved makes the book very readable. Indeed, Kim's book is an excellent example of philosophical writing that manages to be technical without becoming a labor to read. The book would be an excellent introduction to the topic of mental causation for an upper-level philosophy of mind class or graduate seminar on the topic. Indeed, it could even be used during the latter half of a mid-level philosophy of mind or metaphysics class. The book provides an extremely clear systematization of a large range of material, and thus serves as a good introduction to the views in the field. Still, it is by no means limited to this role. Kim offers substantive criticisms of the views he discusses, and he develops a novel and important position of his own. Philosophers working on, or wishing to become acquainted with, the topics that Kim covers would also do well to look at this excellent book.

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Knowledge in a Social World

Alvin I. Goldman

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The author says that this book lays foundations for a social theory of knowledge, assesses particular practices and institutions in terms of these foundations, and responds to the repudiation of the quest for truth, reason, and objectivity by postmodernism and radical social constructionism.

Construing knowledge as true belief, error as false belief, and ignorance as the absence of true belief, Goldman proposes a form of veritistic or truth-based epistemology. On his view, social epistemology has the normative purpose of evaluating social practices in terms of their respective knowledge consequences.

Goldman takes the aim of a theory of truth to be the explanation of what is meant by the term 'truth' rather than the attempt to develop a criterion of truth. The latter task he assigns to the theory of evidence, justification, or truth determination. Following a critique of pragmatic, instrumentalist, verificationist, coherentist, and deflationist theories of truth, he presents his version of the correspondence theory, saying: "an item X (a proposition, a sentence, a belief, etc.) is true if and only if X is descriptively successful, that is, X purports to describe reality and its content fits reality"(59).

Goldman acknowledges the need to explain when an item has descriptive content and what counts as fitting or corresponding to reality, but he does not do so. Denying that a correspondence theory must invoke a unique category of truth-bearers or to assert the existence of facts, Goldman fails to explain what a proposition is, whether he is talking about sentence (or belief) types or tokens, etc. This is not a satisfactory theory of truth.

Laying out the framework for his social epistemology, Goldman discusses the issue of epistemic circularity. This form of circularity is commonly illustrated by the example of using visual perception to check upon the reliability of visual perception. The apparent or alleged difficulty is that although the truth of the conclusion is not assumed as a premise, it is presupposed by the argument.

Goldman describes two types of epistemic circularity. In direct epistemic circularity, it is impossible to validate the reliability of that practice using only other practices. For example, humans can validate or justify claims to the reliability of human cognitive practices only by using such practices. By contrast, indirect circularity occurs when practice A can be checked by at least one other practice B, but B requires the use of A to check its reliability.

Stating that he is unworried by this alleged problem, Goldman says that given a finite number of epistemic practices, some sort of circularity is necessary. He also suggests that wide practices such as cognition or human cognition are more open to direct epistemic circularity than are narrower practices such as visual inspection.

Goldman's comments raise questions regarding what counts as a practice, but he fails to address this topic. Given that reliability of a process can easily vary with the specified width and given the problem of nonarbitrarily specifying this width, it is disappointing that the author says nothing about this topic.

Goldman contends that each new visual sighting is a separate and independent test of the judgment rendered by a previous sighting. Because vision does not remember what it saw previously, and is not intending to keep its story consistent, it is capable of rendering conflicting reports, especially when subsequent visual checks may be from closer proximity, a different angle, etc. Goldman contends that a Bayesian analysis shows that self-corroboration provides positive evidence for the reliability of this practice.

He does not provide the Bayesian analysis in detail, but describes it qualitatively. Setting aside the evil demon hypothesis, *D*, he considers the hypothesis (or collection of hypotheses) that vision is unsystematically unreliable. Call this '*U*'. Let us call the hypothesis (or collection of hypotheses) that vision is reliable '*R*'. Goldman claims that "as long as the likelihood of the corroboration is higher given the reliability hypothesis than given the (unsystematic) unreliability hypothesis, corroboration events provide evidence in favor of reliability" (86).

Assuming the positive relevance definition of confirmation, Goldman's contention is that if $p(O/R) > p(O/U)$, then $p(R/O) > p(R)$. This does not follow from Bayes's theorem. Supposing that $p(R) = p(U)$ and using Bayes's theorem, it follows that $p(R/O) - p(R) > p(U/O) - P(U)$, but this is compatible with $p(R/O) < p(R)$.

To obtain Goldman's result, it seems that we must regard *U* as the complement or denial of *R* (symbolized as ' $\neg R$ '). From this special case of Bayes's theorem, viz., $p(R/O)/p(\neg R/O) = [p(R)Xp(O/R)]/[p(\neg R)Xp(O/U)]$, we may derive $p(O/R)/p(O/\neg R) = [p(O\&R) - p(R)Xp(O\&R)] / [p(O)xp(R) - p(R)Xp(O\&R)]$. If $p(O/R)/p(O/\neg R) > 1$, then $p(O\&R) > p(O)Xp(R)$, i.e., $p(R/O) > p(R)$ and *O* confirms *R*.

However, this derivation requires the assumption that the hypothesis *U* (unsystematic unreliability) is properly understood as the complement or negation of the hypothesis *R* (reliability). Given the existence of a demon hypothesis *D* (systematic unreliability), the derivation of this special case is irrelevant to the question of the self-corroboration of any reliable practice.

Goldman's social epistemology employs notions of intrinsic and instrumental veritistic or V-value. Regarding intrinsic V-value, he says that it is possible to use the traditional trichotomous classification scheme that describes three types of credal attitude toward a proposition, viz., believe it, disbelieve (reject) it, or withhold judgment. There is also a degree of belief (DB) scheme that equates degrees of belief with subjective probabilities. The DB scheme allows infinitely many degrees of strengths of belief from zero to one. Recognizing that identifying degrees of belief with subjective probabilities is controversial, he uses this approach for some discussions.

He notes that translating from the DB scheme to the trichotomous scheme and vice versa is also a problem. The author mentions, but does not develop, the use of confidence intervals rather than precise point probabilities.

The author says that an agent S's belief states have V-value or disvalue when they are responses to a question of the form 'Is it the case that P?' that interests the agent or when other agents are interested in S's knowing the answer. On the trichotomous approach, if S believes a true proposition P, the V-value is 1. If S disbelieves (rejects) the true proposition P, the V-value is 0. If S withholds judgment, the V-value is .50. Holding that if some agent believes a proposition P, he rejects its negation and vice versa, Goldman says that there is no need for additional principles concerning falsehoods.

Veritistic analysis focuses on changes in V-value over time. Suppose S initially withholds judgment (belief) regarding a true proposition P at t_1 but at t_2 comes to believe P. This is a positive change from .5 to 1. There is a parallel to this in the DB scheme.

Practices are V-evaluated in terms of their causal contributions to belief states with various V-values. Thus, if in the previous case, S had applied practice P to make the positive change noted, then this practice earns positive credit. The evaluation of a practice requires the examination of its performance across a wide range of cases. Because, on his view, what is of interest is the propensity of a practice to generate true beliefs, possible as well as actual cases are to be considered. However, he holds that these cases must be of the type people typically encounter and to which the practice is intended to be applied. He also discusses the comparative V-evaluation of practices, i.e., the comparison of their propensities to produce true beliefs.

The author goes on to describe the V-evaluation of practices across communities of agents. Here he proposes measuring the aggregate V-value of the practice by using the group's mean V-value. The comparative evaluation of social practices would require the comparison of mean V-values for the same group and the same questions.

Goldman's view raises some very serious questions, some of which have been noted previously. First, there are epistemic problems. Goldman has assumed that beliefs have objective truth-values, but does not assume that these are known by the agents or the V-evaluator. Similarly, in presenting a veritistic rationale for Bayesian inference, Goldman insists that the agent's subjective likelihoods match the objective likelihoods. It appears that, in many cases, we have nothing but estimates of these objective likelihoods. Hence, the application of the method of V-evaluation is problematic.

Goldman may dismiss these epistemic problems as mere difficulties in the application of his method of V-evaluation. He may insist

that he is interested less in application than in conceptual clarity. So, let us press on to that.

My second criticism has the form of a dilemma. Either we can individuate beliefs and practices in some nonarbitrary manner or we cannot. If we cannot, then Goldman's veritistic social epistemology suffers from deep conceptual confusion. This, of course, is a standard problem for reliabilism.

On the other hand, even if we can individuate beliefs and practices, there seems to be no additional epistemic value attached to Goldman's view to having (1) significant vs. trivial true beliefs, or (2) systematically organized true beliefs vs. a mere collection, or (3) reasoned true beliefs vs. true beliefs obtained by mimicry or memorization.

It is quite obvious that we place a much higher epistemic value on having significant truths that are systematically organized and that are justified or warranted by reason. The author has missed some significant aspects of human knowledge.

Goldman's veritistic social epistemology seems to harbor deep conceptual confusions on either horn of this dilemma. It should come as no surprise to the reader that this reviewer does not suggest that this book be used in philosophy courses.

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Doing Philosophy: An Introduction through Thought Experiments

Theodore Schick Jr. and Lewis Vaughn

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How do we teach freshmen to explore major philosophical questions? Most introductory textbooks offer a very familiar strategy: They expose students to select writings of Descartes, Kant, or Hume and hope that this exposure will help the novice to appreciate the complexity and beauty of the mind-body problem, the problem of free will, or the questions of right conduct. Alas, this strategy has obvious drawbacks. Most beginning students (at least in my classes) have great difficulty reading and understanding the writing of thinkers like Hume, Berkeley, or Kant on their own. The problem does not go away if the textbook substitutes Rawls for Kant or Hempel for Hume, or Searle for Descartes. Freshmen find the writing of most thoughtful philosophers initially inaccessible. This leads to a situation that is familiar to most teachers: Students come to the class sessions and expect the teacher to explain to them what they should